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On 1st July 2009, the profession of “practitioner psychologist” was incorporated into the Health Professions Council (HPC), with protection for a series of professional titles, namely
	Practitioner psychologist
	Registered psychologist
	Clinical psychologist
	Counselling psychologist
	Educational psychologist
	Forensic psychologist
	Health psychologist
	Occupational psychologist
	Sport and exercise psychologist
Members of the British Psychological Society (BPS) admitted to these titles automatically moved across onto the Register. Also charged with regulating counsellors and psychotherapists, in July 2009 the HPC launched a consultation on its recommendations for this process, which has generated considerable debate and opposition.
In this paper, I put these developments into context and raise some questions about feminist responses to the creation of regulated professions. First, I briefly explain the role of the state in relation to professional status and then I summarise recent developments in the professional status of psychology, psychotherapy and counselling. In the second half of the paper, I examine two theoretical approaches to questions of professional status, one Weberian and one Foucauldian. In relation to each I highlight reasons why feminists might find themselves occupying ambivalent positions.

On professional status
What is a profession? Conventionally, a profession is a self-regulating occupation that  (a) admits members on the basis of extensive education, the acquisition of which is attested by formal qualifications, (b) maintains discipline through codes of professional ethics, and (c) is recognised and protected by law. Thus, both the state and higher education are integral to the constitution of professions. In popular parlance, the terms “profession” and “professional” have come to be used much more loosely to refer to occupations and practices that claim a certain kind of cultural status regardless of their legal underpinning. Typically, voluntary membership bodies that seek to codify and uphold specified standards of training and practice and demarcate a professional field are central to such claims. However, these bodies and the standards they promulgate have no statutory underpinning and are therefore not legally binding.
In the early and now longstanding mutual shaping of relations between professional occupations, universities and the state, there were three professions: the clergy, medicine and law. These three have since been joined by many more and the rise of professions continued apace through much of the twentieth century. In an article published in the American Journal of Sociology in 1964, the political scientist Harold Wilensky asked if modern society was heading towards “the professionalisation of everyone”. While his answer was “no”, flowing from an argument that emphasised the authority of established professions, the question has a continuing relevance as claims to professional status abound. Put another way, is professional status being democratised by more and more occupations being incorporated informally if not formally.
In the latter part of the twentieth century, trust in, and the authority of, established, elite professions came under increasing challenge. This has led to some adjustments in the legal basis of professions, with self-regulation, modified through the incorporation of an increasing number of lay members into the regulatory councils of professional bodies. These lay members are intended to prevent members of the profession closing ranks to protect one another by providing a degree of externality and to increase the voice of the so-called public. Whether the processes by which such lay members are appointed can deliver such results is another question.
Notwithstanding evidence that the esteem accorded to professions and professionals has been falling, the trend for legally-based professional status to be extended to cover an increasing number of occupations has continued. Indeed, alongside introducing externality into professional regulation, a key policy response to the erosion of trust and authority in various occupational groups has been to extend the reach of the statutory regulation. A trope regularly wheeled out in support of this strategy is that of the unqualified, unscrupulous person who puts up the brass plaque proclaiming their status as an X, Y or Z thereby misleading the public and damaging the reputation of the all those legitimate Xs, Ys or Zs. So, at its most basic, regulation is meant to provide the public with assurances about the qualifications and probity of those practising under specified, legally protected, professional titles. The confidence the public can have in such professions is meant to be more effectively achieved because of the externality embedded in the bodies that regulate them, through which the qualified but incompetent can be weeded out. In other words, regulation is meant to reduce risk and is in part a response to risk aversity.

Towards the regulation of psychologists, psychotherapists and counsellors
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, there has been much discussion of, and moves towards, the regulation of psychologists, psychotherapists and counsellors. The early months of 2001 brought two key developments. First, in January 2001, the Westminster government announced its support for the principle of regulating psychotherapy and related occupations. The announcement came in the context of the second reading of a Private Members Bill introduced by Lord Alderdice, which sought to institute the statutory regulation of psychotherapy. The government did not support the Alderdice Bill (which duly fell), explicitly rejecting its specific focus on psychotherapy, and argued instead for a more inclusive approach to the regulation of practices including counselling and other “psychological” or “talking” therapies. The announcement set in train developments that are impacting directly on these practices today.
Secondly, in April 2001, the formalities for creating the Health Professions Council began, leading to its formal establishment a year later. The HPC replaced the former Council for Professions Supplementary to Medicine, through which twelve occupations were then regulated, including arts therapy, chiropody & podiatry, physiotherapy, radiography and speech & language therapy. As well as instituting a regulatory Council that contained equal numbers of registrants (i.e. members of the professions) and “lay” members, the HPC was granted explicit powers to incorporate new professions in the future. A thirteenth profession joined in 2004, namely operating department practitioners. The possibility that the Health Professions Council would provide the framework for statutory regulation had been on the horizon when the government announced its support for the principle of regulating psychotherapists and related occupations. 
Statutory regulation of an occupation cannot be achieved – or imposed – in the absence of pre-existing, voluntary professional membership organisations capable of entering into discussions with state agencies. Where a field includes a multiplicity of voluntary membership organisations, these bodies have to be willing and able to come together in some way. Around the time of the government’s announcement in January 2001, there was a flurry of activity as different bodies in the field of psychology, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis and counselling staked out their positions and entered into – or refrained from – discussion about both the principle of statutory regulation and potential mechanisms through which it might be instituted. One of the more obvious tactical moves was made in 2000 when the then British Association for Counselling (BAC) renamed itself the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP). The name change was presented in the Association’s house journal as a “correction” to reflect more accurately than the previous name the composition of the membership. But the BAC had already been lobbying for “counselling” to be included in any moves towards the statutory regulation of psychotherapy, like the Alderdice Bill before parliament at that time, which explicitly excluded counselling on the grounds that the field lacked the coherence required for regulation. It is therefore hard to avoid the interpretation that a key motive for the change of name was to ensure that the organisation secured a place at the table in future discussions about the regulation of psychotherapy and related practices.
In the early years of the twenty-first century, several organisations (including BPS, BACP, UKCP) united around the idea of a new Psychological Professions Council, launching a formal proposal in November 2006. However, this was rejected by the Government in a White Paper on the future of regulation published in February 2007, which recommended that psychologists, psychotherapists and counsellors should be regulated by the HPC as a matter of priority (Department of Health 2007). Soon thereafter, the question of the regulation of psychologists was separated from, and moved forward before, psychotherapists and counsellors, driven, I assume by the capacity of the BPS to claim its capacity to represent the entire profession. The accreditation and registration arrangements operated by the BPS provided the basis for incorporation of “practitioner psychologists” into the HPC. 
Meanwhile, a Professional Liaison Group for psychotherapists and counsellors was charged with discussing and developing recommendations for these groups. As noted above, its recommendations were published in July 2009, with responses sought by mid-October. The HPC was seeking to finalise proposals by December 2009, but the timetable has slipped in part because of the large number of responses to the consultation. It is likely that a General Election will intervene before the regulation of counsellors and psychotherapists is implemented and some opponents are arguing that this provides an opportunity for a reversal of a policy direction that has been in place for nearly a decade. However there is no guarantee that such an about turn will happen. Therefore, despite a considerable amount of opposition within counselling and psychotherapy to regulation by the HPC as opposed to some other body, and a smaller but still vociferous body of opposition to any form of statutory regulation, those accredited as counsellors or psychotherapists through voluntary bodies – including UKCP and BACP among others – may find their names moving onto the HPC register within the next two or three years, unless they take positive steps to the contrary. 
The question of statutory regulation for counsellors and psychotherapists has generated much critical debate within the pages of practitioner journals, together with a number of conferences and scholarly publications (for example Gladstone 2007, Parker 2007), Parker and Revelli 2008; Reeves and Mollon 2009; Samuels 2006). It is not my purpose to review, revisit or rehearse these arguments but instead I take a step back from the specific example of the regulation of psychology, psychotherapy and counselling to consider two different sets of theoretical resources for thinking about professions, drawing out connections with feminist ideas. 

Weberian approaches
In Weberian social theory, professions are viewed as labour market monopolies, which are produced and sustained through processes of occupational closure that maintain tight controls on admission (Berlant 1975; Friedson 1970; Murphy 1988). They maintain their labour market monopolies using such tactics as carefully guarding the type and number of people able to access to educational credentials and collaboration with the state to enforce their monopoly power. In the classic examples of law and medicine, professions are unambiguously elitist, and, historically, were able to use control on entry to exclude women. Their association with elite universities continues to privilege those with access to the most elite school education. Members of these professions claim unique expertise and authority.  Relationships with clients or patients are unequal and hierarchical. Whatever positions they occupy in other aspects of their lives, while consulting a professional, the person seeking professional assistance is likely to feel relatively powerless, perhaps disempowered, often vulnerable. 
The entry of women into these traditional professions can be seen as an expression of a feminist politics of equality, enshrined in law through sex equality and anti-discrimination legislation. It has also enabled the development of feminist groupings within these professions, thereby contributing to internal pressures for change in the way professions are practiced, for example by rethinking the form of relationships between professionals and their clients or patients. 
In addition to changes in the gender composition of elite professions, the gender composition of professional status has changed through the emergence of new professions. For example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in the UK, nurses campaigned long and hard to obtain the legal status of a profession through the institution of a state-sponsored system of registration governed by the nurses themselves (Witz 1990, 1992). This example is interesting for several inter-related reasons. First, it extended the locus of education for professions beyond the universities although subsequent developments have located it back there. Secondly, the exclusivity of the profession was defined in part in relation to a traditionally superior profession, namely that of medicine, setting in train the emergence of other less elite professions, including allied health professions and now psychology, psychotherapy and counselling. Thirdly, the achievement of the legal status of a profession did not confer the prestige and cultural authority associated with the elite professions. For example in governmental classifications of occupations, nursing became what has sometimes been called a “semi-profession”. Fourthly and as I will come back to in a moment it created a female-dominated profession for the first time.
Anne Witz (1990, 1992) has examined the case of the professionalisation of nursing using and extending Weberian concepts. She shows how a subordinate occupation group, such as nursing, can achieve occupational closure through a combination of tactics.  She describes the professionalisation of nursing in terms of dual closure, combining usurpationary and exclusionary strategies. With regard to the former, nurses campaigning for statutory registration sought to usurp, or wrest control of, nurse education and the conditions of nurse labour from both the medical profession and the hospitals in which they worked. They also adopted the exclusionary tactics of controlling entry to the profession thereby maintaining an occupational monopoly. Additionally, demarcation of specific areas of authority and responsibility from those traditionally in more senior positions – medical doctors – established an important precedent that has facilitated the proliferation of professions within and beyond the health care field. 
The achievement of professional status by nurses created a strongly women-dominated profession and thereby an area of female autonomy policed by women. It also brought within the domain of professions practices traditionally characterised as feminine. Whereas the entry of women into the traditional professions of law and medicine began to feminise elite professions, the extension of professional status to subordinate occupational groups produced quite different forms of feminisation. The category of “professions” began to be feminised in two additional ways, both as a profession of an occupation dominated by women and as a professional within which the work has been strongly associated with femininity.
From a feminist perspective, such forms of professionalisation are complex and contradictory. They achieve advances for some women and for the domain of activities often devalued as feminine. They create areas of relative autonomy for women and achieve new forms of recognition for women. But they also increase hierarchical differences and inequalities between those women admitted to professional status and those who are not, and they institutionalise in new ways the association between women and feminine practices. It is therefore not surprising that they generate ambivalent responses among feminists.  
There are some parallels between the gendered politics of the professionalisation of nursing through statutory regulation in the early twentieth century and the regulation of psychology, psychotherapy and counselling in the early twenty-first century: they too are female-dominated occupations, often associated with feminine attributes, involved in efforts to secure positions within a hierarchy, and, in the case of psychotherapy and counselling, associated with the transfer of education into universities, with qualifications becoming increasingly academically defined (also see Bondi 2004). 

Foucauldian approaches
A different way of theorising professional status draws on Foucauldian ideas about governmentality, in relation to which professions can be described as technologies for governing “at a distance” (Fournier, 1999). Professional status confers autonomy on practitioners, who are deemed to have internalised and embodied the knowledge and conduct required for professional practice. Members of a profession can be relied upon to act in ways that express the frameworks of governance into which they have been recruited, and they submit themselves to the associated disciplinary mechanisms. As technologies for governing at a distance, professions are key means through which human beings become subjects enrolled into specific social norms and practices. Professionals themselves are enrolled through their professional training and status. The clients or patients with whom they work are enrolled through the actions of these professionals. 
This theoretical approach is not one that conceptualises human subjects as dupes of some impersonal system, stripped of agency or acting under false consciousness. Rather, human agency is conceptualised as actively produced through our enrolment into systems of governance. Governmentality works because – or at least in so far as – we actively govern ourselves. In Judith Butler’s (1997) words, “the subject” is “the effect of power in recoil” (6), and she argues that “in the act of opposing subordination, the subject reiterates its subjection” (11). On this account there is no innocent or external vantage point from which to exercise the agency required to criticise or contest a model or theory of subjectivity. Moreover, the model of subjectivity in question is one within which subjects are understood to be capable of self-governance so that the act of advancing a critical view of the theory enacts the very conceptualisation of subjectivity under scrutiny.
One way of elaborating this argument is through the concept of neo-liberalism, a term that originated as a way of describing the resurgence of free-market economic theory, and which has been extended to describe the way in which a discourse of market, quasi-market or consumer-based relationships has colonised numerous arenas of economic, social, cultural and political life. Understood as a form of governmentality, neo-liberalism works by installing a concept of the human subject as an autonomous, individualised, self-directing, decision-making agent at the heart of policy-making. In so far as this vision of the human subject is recognised and assimilated, people are recruited into neo-liberal forms of governmentality, even if, as Butler (1997) describes, they also, simultaneously, seek to resist some of its effects.
One of the most widely-cited Foucauldian writers on governmentality, Nikolas Rose (1985, 1990, 1999), has drawn attention to the influential role of psychology and related practices in producing highly individualised, self-monitoring, self-governing and subjectively-oriented subjects. He traced the rise of a wide variety of “technologies of subjectivity” (Rose 1990, 8), and he argued that “the diversity and heterogeneity of psychology has been one of the keys to its continued inventiveness […] and wide-ranging social applicability” (Rose, 1990, 10-11). Across this diversity he identified and emphasised overarching commonalities in their effects, especially their role in producing both “intensely subjective beings”, and modern societies that accord a central role to the “subjective aspects of the lives of individuals as they conduct their commerce with the world, with others and with themselves” (Rose 1990, 3). This is all about what we might call emotional life. By attending to emotional distress, psychology, psychotherapy and counselling actively produce, and foster preoccupation, with emotional life.
From this perspective, psychology, psychotherapy and counselling are not merely examples of occupations enrolled into the process of professionalisation. Rather they are absolutely central to the operation of neo-liberal governmentality. From this perspective, the statutory regulation of psychology, psychotherapy and counselling might be understood as a strategy by which the state attempts to strengthen its own role in governance. It can then better integrate such processes as risk management into professional governance. But the state does not do this separately from the voluntary bodies to which practitioners belong, which may already be required to join by their employers. Through these means, the state ensures that governance “at a distance” is in place and is maintained.
 	The model of human subjects as highly individualised, risk-aware, consumer-citizens that is associated with neo-liberal governmentality is deeply problematic. However this model is not necessarily realised in that neo-liberal subjectivity does not inevitably generate subjects oriented solely to the narcissistic gratification of individual desires via market opportunities and capable of thinking about risk only in terms of simplistic splits between victims and perpetrators. Despite extensive critiques of aspects of neo-liberalism, certain aspects of neo-liberal subjectivity hold attractions for feminists and other political activists because activism depends, at least to some extent, on belief in the existence of forms of subjectivity that enable people to make choices about their lives. For example, feminists have repeatedly drawn attention to the necessity as well as the limitations of autonomous agency as a basis for emancipatory politics. This entails “buying into” aspects of the very model of subjectivity that critics of neo-liberal governmentality also seek to contest. Again, therefore, debate, conflict and ambivalence within and among feminists is not surprising. 
The Foucauldian account I have offered does not engage directly with the specific question of statutory regulation but nevertheless offers resources within which it might be thought about. We might ask questions, for example, about what the varied responses to, and strategies in relation to statutory regulation, tell us about the forms of emotional life and the characteristics of subjectivity psychology, psychotherapy and counselling mobilise and promulgate. I think it is especially useful to think of it as an approach that when allied with feminist approaches to knowledge, can help us to think ambivalently and to locate ourselves – as researchers, as professionals – inside the fields that we study (also see Bondi 2005).

Conclusion
While the statutory regulation of “practitioner psychologists” by the HPC has now taken place, we know little about the impacts and even the extent of compliance. In so far as they are represented by the BPS, psychologists appear to have accepted this form of regulation. In counselling and psychotherapy the position is more complex partly because of the involvement of several different bodies through which the field is organised. During the final months of 2009 opposition to HPC regulation gathered momentum in response to initial HPC recommendations. However this opposition is internally differentiated, with some arguing against regulation by the HPC but nevertheless supportive of state regulation in principle, while others argue against any form of state regulation. As we might expect, feminist voices can be found across this diversity. I have offered Weberian and Foucauldian approaches to theorising professionalisation in order to help understand some of these differences. 
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